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NOTES

THE MYTH OF FETAL PERSONHOOD:
RECONCILING ROE AND FETAL
HOMICIDE LAWS
INTRODUCTION

On the cold morning of February 20, 2009, Kenzie Houk, a young
mother and bride-to-be, was found dead in her western Pennsylvania
farmhouse.' She had been shot in the back of the head while she lay
sleeping.2 It took police but a day to find and charge their prime
suspect: Jordan Brown, the son of Kenzie's fianc6e.3 Police reported
that Jordan allegedly, like any good criminal, shot Kenzie, ditched the
shotgun shell, got on the school bus, and went on to another day in
fifth grade.4 Jordan Brown was eleven years old.s Kenzie Houk was
twenty-six and pregnant with Christopher Houk, who was at eight and
a half months gestation. 6
As the Houk family grieves, the law must grapple with the
questions of "Who?" and "How many?" How many "persons" really

1

Edecio Martinez, 12-Year-Old Jordan Brown to Be Tried as an Adult for Allegedly
Murdering Pregnant Woman, CBS NEWS, Mar. 30, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301
-504083_162-20001398-504083.html; Ramit Plushnick-Masti, Jordan Brown Killed Father's
Pregnant Girlfriend, Charged as Adult, HuFFINGTON POST, Feb. 21, 2009, http://www
.huffingtonpost.coni/2009/02/21/jordan-brown-killed-fathe_n_168862.html.
2 Plushnick-Masti, supra note 1.
3

Id.

4

Martinez, supranote 1; Plushnick-Masti, supra note 1.

5 Plushnick-Masti, supra note 1.
6 Boy Held in Pa. Killing to Go to Juvenile Facility, USA
TODAY, Feb.
25, 2009, http://www.usatoday.connews/nation/2009-02-23-llyrold-murderer-charged_N.htm;
Martinez, supra note 1.
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died that day? How many murders should Jordan Brown have to
account for? Currently, Pennsylvania law provides that the "criminal
homicide of an unborn child" can be classified as either murder or
voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, Pennsylvania charged Jordan
Brown not just with the murder of Kenzie Houk, but with the murder
of Christopher Houk as well.
Many, including the Houks, probably laud this double charge.
Others, including some abortion-rights activists and organizations,
may condemn it.9 For decades now, states have been proliferating
statutes like the one in Pennsylvania-so-called "fetal homicide"
statutes.' 0 Even the federal government passed such a law, the Unborn
Victims of Violence Act of 2004.11 This act, like its state analogues,
makes it a separate crime to kill or injure a "child . .. who is

in utero."l 2 These laws establish one controversial principle: the
unprovoked killing of a fetus is murder. This idea stirs up strong
reactions from both sides of the abortion debate. For instance,
Gloria Feldt, president of the Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, bemoaned the Unborn Victims of Violence Act as "creating
legal personhood for the fetus."' 3 The pro-life movement embraced
this legal result. Richard Land, president of the Southern Baptist
Convention's Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission, proclaimed,
"It is another reminder we are slowly but surely winning the battle ...
when it comes to the personhood of unborn human beings." 14
These hopes and fears are part of a much larger debate about fetal
personhood in American society. The law is not clear on exactly
who or what counts as a person,' 5 but many are already taking sides.
Pro-choice advocates worry that, if the law declares the fetus
7
8

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §2603 (West 1998).
Plushnick-Masti, supra note 1.
9 See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 13-14.
10See infra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
1 Pub. L. No. 108-212, § 2(a), 118 Stat. 568 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
12 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). The relevant text reads:

§ 1841

(2006)).

Whoever [during the commission of an enumerated federal offense] causes the death
of, or bodily injury . .. to, a child, who is in utero at the time the conduct takes place,
is guilty of a separate offense . ... [T]he punishment for that separate offense is the
same as the punishment provided under Federal law for that conduct had that injury
or death occurred to the unborn child's mother.
Id. § 1841(a)(1)-(a)(2)(A).
13Planned Parenthood Affiliates of N.J., Senate Passes Dangerous Unborn Victims
of Violence Act, http://www.plannedparenthoodnj.org/library/topic/abortion-access/unborn
victimsact (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
14Tom Strode, President Signs Rights for Unborn Victims, BAFTIST PRESS, Apr. 2, 2004,
http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=17985.
15 See discussion infra Part .A.I.
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a "person," then the war for reproductive rights will be lost.,6 The
pro-life population, on the other hand, welcomes such an
interpretation as a means to wage their own war on the legality of

abortion.17
Fetal murder laws like the one Jordan Brown was charged with
are ostensibly about violence against pregnant women.' 8 However,
in protecting women, these laws classify the killing of a fetus as
"murder," and necessarily imply, if they do not directly state, that the
fetus is a "person" under the law. Several scholars and politicians
worry that feticide laws turn the fetus into an untouchable, and thus
an unabortable, entity.' 9 They claim that fetal laws necessarily prompt
a "reduction of pregnant women's rights." 2 0 Pro-life scholars have
also noted this supposed inconsistency in the law, claiming that,
"[t]he discrepancies in the law regarding an unborn fetus's legal
status represent an overall disingenuousness, and perhaps even
dishonesty." 21 They suggest that "[ilt makes no sense for courts to say
an 'abortion' of an unborn child is legal, but the 'wrongful death' of
the same child by someone other than the mother is not legal." 2 2
This fear of fetal legislation assumes a hypocrisy in the law.
Opponents of feticide laws wonder, "How can the U.S. Supreme
Court's declaration in Roe that a fetus is not a person ... and the
Unborn Victims of Violence Act that makes killing a fetus. . . a

crime be reconciled?" 23 Few scholars have attempted such a
16 See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide laws, 67 OHIO
ST. L.J. 721, 724 (2006) ("Proponents of legal abortion have much to lose by agreeing to
conduct the debate about reproductive rights within a framework that hinges on the status of the
fetus . . . .").
17 See, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text.
18 See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 721 (arguing that fetal homicide laws should be viewed
as "the pregnant woman's defense of her bodily autonomy, rather than . . . the personhood or
non-personhood of the unborn").
9 See, e.g., Luke M. Milligan, A Theory of Stability: John Rawls, Fetal Homicide, and
Substantive Due Process, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1194-95 (2007) (discussing the various
reactions from pro-choice groups and legislators to the Unborn Victims of Violence Act); Alec
Walen, The Constitutionality of States Extending Personhood to the Unborn, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 161, 163 (2005) (arguing that feticide laws put Roe v. Wade in jeopardy); Aaron
Wagner, Comment, Texas Two-Step: Serving up Fetal Rights by Side-Stepping Roe v. Wade
Has Set the Table for Another Showdown on Fetal Personhood in Texas and Beyond, 32 Tnx.
TECH L. REV. 1085, 1088-89 (2001) (arguing that feticide laws threaten Roe v. Wade).
20 Nora Christie Sandstad, Pregnant Women and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Feminist
Examination of the Trend to Eliminate Women's Rights During Pregnancy, 26 LAW & INEQ.
171,173 (2008).
21 william E. Buelow Hl, Comment, To Be and Not To Be: Inconsistencies in the Law
Regarding the Legal Status of the Unborn Fetus,71 TEMP. L. REV. 963, 964 (1998).
22 Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: JurisprudentialInconsistencies in
Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 933, 933 (1995)
(quoting D.L. Cuddy, Letter to the Editor, Freefor All-Reversing Roe v. Wade, WASH. POST,
Jan. 28, 1989, at A59).
23 Wagner, supra note 19, at 1088.
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reconciliation.24 This Note shows, however, that laws surrounding
fetal personhood do not challenge abortion rights and argues that
so-called "fetal rights" laws will not and do not live up to their hype.
Contrary to suggestions by advocates on both sides of the abortion
debate, when a state confers "personhood" to an unborn human, it
does not sound the death knell for reproductive rights. Personhood as
conferred through feticide legislation is not the same as natural
personhood, and does not garner the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, it is entirely logical for a state to punish
the same act (termination of a pregnancy) differently in different
circumstances. Abortion by the mother is simply not the same as an
unprovoked assault on the fetus by a third party.
This Note begins in Part I by examining the present state of
fetal treatment under the law. Currently, fetuses are not persons
for the purposes of abortion jurisprudence, but many state laws
nevertheless still refer to fetuses as "persons."
Part II illustrates how these seemingly contradictory notions can be
reconciled. First, theories of personhood, federalism, and linguistics
are examined to demonstrate that constitutional fetal personhood25
does not exist. Second, Part II discusses more specific ways in which
fetal statutes do not conflict with Roe or abortion rights. Namely, fetal
laws recognize state interest, not fetal interest. State protection does
not imply personhood; states can and do protect non-persons quite
often. Feticide laws also do not pit mother against state, as abortion
laws do. Rather, the laws logically distinguish between the rights of a
pregnant woman and the non-rights of third-party attackers.
Finally, this Note concludes by arguing that feticide laws actually
promote reproductive autonomy. The right to carry a child to term is
an oft-forgotten corollary of the right to abortion. These laws protect
women in that sacred interest.
I. CURRENT FETAL "RIGHTS"
A. CriminalLaw
American law has had a troubled relationship with the fetus
and abortion. Legislation regarding abortion began appearing in the
early-nineteenth century, growing largely out of English common
24 Professor Carolyn Ramsey, however, has made great strides in addressing this query.
See generally Ramsey, supranote 16.
2 Throughout this Note, "constitutional personhood" means personhood under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Constitutional personhood would grant the fetus the right to life and
equal protection of the laws. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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law.26 At that time, states severely punished abortions performed
after the quickening 27 of a fetus, but were more lenient when abortion
occurred pre-quickening.2 8 As the century wore on, states began
eliminating the quickening distinction and increasing punishments
for all abortions. 29 By the 1950s, a majority of jurisdictions had
completely banned all non-therapeutic abortions. 3 0 This, of course, all
changed with the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade.31
In Roe, the Supreme Court recognized that the decision to
reproduce is a protected privacy interest. 32 The case legalized
abortion in America, although not without restriction. 3 3 Part of the
Court's reasoning was based on the finding that the fetus was not a
"person" for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, and was
therefore not guaranteed a right to life.34 Roe also held that a state has
important interests; namely, promotion of potential life.35 Thus, a
state could, if it so chose, prohibit abortion past the point of fetal
viability,36 except where necessary to save the life or health of the
mother. Although Roe has been modified somewhat by subsequent
Supreme Court cases, its essential holding remains intact. 38
The destruction of a fetus by a third-party aggressor39 has followed
a different trajectory. Outside of the abortion context, the law has
historically recognized penalties for both homicide and wrongful
death of a fetus. Traditionally, criminal common law began by
following what is known as the born-alive rule.40 Under this rule as it
was applied by the states, murder charges could be brought against
26 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 138 (1973). The Roe Court also gives an overview of the
English common law and other historical attitudes concerning abortion. See id. at 129-38.
27 Quickening is the point in pregnancy at which the mother first feels the fetus move.
This normally occurs between seventeen and twenty weeks gestation. KEITH L. MOORE ET AL.,

COLOR ATLAS OF CLINICAL EMBRYOLOGY 54 (2d ed. 2000).

Roe, 410 U.S. at 139.
Id.
3o Id. A therapeutic abortion is one done to protect the life or health of the mother. Id.
31 410 U.S. 113.
is broad enough to encompass a
32 See id. at 153 (finding that the "right of privacy ...
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy").
33 Id. at 165-66.
34 Id. at 156-59.
35Id. at 164.
36 Id. at 164-65. Viability is the developmental point in gestation "at which there is
a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb." Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992).
37 Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
38 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (rejecting Roe's trimester framework but upholding its
essential doctrine). See generally Buelow, supra note 21, at 965-71 (giving an overview of
abortion decisions and current law).
39 As opposed to a physician performing an abortion.
40 Buelow, supra note 21, at 972-73; Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child:
The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 563,563 (1987).
28
29
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one who caused injury to a fetus in the womb, but only if the fetus
survived birth and later died because of the inflicted injuries.4 1
William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England,
expressed this long-standing rule as follows: "To kill a child in it's
[sic] mother's womb, is now no murder, but a great misprision: but if
the child be born alive, and dieth by reason of the potion or bruises it
received in the womb it seems, by the better opinion, to be murder."42
The rationale was that murder referred only to the killing of a person,
and if a fetus died in utero, it was not yet a person and therefore
could not be a victim of murder. 4 3 Many post-Roe cases held to this
rule." For example, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Greer,45
refused to find that the in-utero killing of a full-term fetus was
murder. The Greer defendant beat his pregnant girlfriend with his
fists and a broomstick, killing her and causing her unborn child to die
in utero.4 The defendant's girlfriend was eight-and-one-half months
pregnant. 47 Although the fetus died as a result of the beating, the
court reversed the defendant's murder conviction on the grounds that
"taking the life of a fetus is not murder . .. unless the fetus is born
alive and subsequently expires as a result of the injuries inflicted.""
The born-alive rule is still good law in some states. 49 However,
many states have moved away from the common law and have begun
specifically recognizing fetal murder as a crime even if the fetus dies
before birth.50 States have done away with the born-alive rule in two
key ways: either through the legislatures or the courts.
First, many states have enacted laws that specifically apply to
the injury or killing of a fetus. Some do this by inserting terms
like "fetus" or "unborn child" into their existing murder statutes.
Buelow, supranote 21, at 972; Forsythe, supra note 40, at 563.
5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 198.
43 See Wagner, supra note 19, at 1100-01 ("The idea was that to have breathed was to
have lived; therefore, to not have breathed was to not have lived.")).
44 See, e.g., State v. Green, 781 P.2d 678, 683 (Kan. 1989) (holding that a stillborn child
had not yet become a human being for purposes of the state's homicide statute); Hollis v.
Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61, 63-64 (Ky. 1983) (holding that, until a fetus is born alive, it is
not a person and cannot not be a victim under the homicide statutes), overruled by
Commonwealth v. Morris, 142 S.W.3d 654 (Ky. 2004).
1980).
45 402 N.E.2d 203 (111.
41

42

46

Id. at 206.

47 Id.
48 Id. at 209. For a more thorough analysis of the born-alive rule and its use in judicial
decisions, see Buelow, supra note 21, at 972-76; Forsythe, supra note 40.
49 See, e.g., State v. Mondragon, 203 P.3d 105, 109 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing
the common law born-alive rule for homicide actions, but ultimately refusing to apply to it
because the defendant was charged with child abuse, not homicide); State v. Beale, 376 S.E.2d
1, 4 (N.C. 1989) (holding that the killing of an unborn viable fetus was not chargeable under the
state's murder statute).
50 Buelow, supra note 21, at 974-78.
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California, for example, added the term "fetus" to its murder statute,
so that it now reads: "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human
being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."51 Similarly, Ohio's
murder statute reads: "No person shall purposely cause the death of
another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy., 5 2 Some
states have enacted entirely new statutes, separate from their current
murder laws, to cover crimes against a fetus. Georgia, for example,
defines the assault of an unborn child as a separate punishable
offense: "A person commits the offense of assault of an unborn child
when such person, without legal justification, attempts to inflict
violent injury to an unborn child."5 3 Battery of an unborn child is
similarly a crime.M
Other states have achieved the same ends via the common law
without amending or adding to their existing criminal codes. These
states have simply chosen to define a "person" under their existing
homicide or manslaughter statutes to include fetuses. The first state to
do so was Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Cass.5s In Cass, the
court held that the defendant could be criminally liable, under the
state's vehicular homicide statute, for the death of a fetus. 56 The
defendant had hit a pregnant pedestrian with his car.57 As a result of
the injuries sustained in the accident, the fetus died in the womb.
The court opined that the term "person" as used in the Massachusetts
penal code was synonymous with "human being," which included
fetuses. 59 Cass established that all fetal murders would fall within the
purview of the Massachusetts homicide law.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Kentucky overruled the
born-alive rule in Commonwealth v. Morris.6 There, the defendant
struck and killed a pregnant woman who was on her way to the
hospital to give birth.6 1 Her unborn child died as well.62 The court
recognized that Kentucky already allowed recovery for the wrongful
death of a fetus, and reasoned that it would be "inherently illogical"

5' CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2008) (emphasis added).

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2903.02(A) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-28(b) (2007).
5 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-29(b) (2007).
5 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984).
56 Id. at 1329. The court noted that all other jurisdictions that had already decided the
same issue had deemed that a fetus could not be a victim of homicide. Id. at 1328.
5 Id. at 1325.
58 Id.
52

5

59 Id.
6
61
62

142 SW.3d 654 (Ky. 2004).
Id. at 655.
Id.
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not to extend the same protections to criminal killings of fetuses.6 3
The court also considered that, after the defendant's actions, but
before the resolution of the case, the Kentucky legislature had passed
a fetal homicide act.64 With the weight of precedent and legislative
intent behind it, the Supreme Court of Kentucky did not hesitate to
reject the born-alive rule. 65 Decisions like Morris and Cass extend
the same status to fetuses as do statutes. However, these decisions
can be considerably more controversial than statutes because they
specifically define the fetus as a person.
Currently, at least thirty-eight states recognize some sort of
penalty for fetal homicide.66 Ten require the fetus to have reached
some developmental landmark, such as viability, before victimhood
applies.67 At least twenty-one others recognize' fetal homicide as a
crime throughout the entire gestational period.6 8 These states make no
distinction between the killing of an eight-month-old fetus and an
eight-week-old fetus. In Minnesota, for example, the state Supreme
Court found criminal liability for the killing of a pre-viable embryo
in State v. Merrill.69 Merrill was accused of shooting and killing a
woman carrying a twenty-seven- to twenty-eight-day-old embryo.70
The court rejected the defendant's equal protection challenge to the
state feticide law, finding that the statute did "not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment by failing to distinguish between a viable and
nonviable fetus." 71 The court held that the statute could be applied as
long as there was the killing of a live embryo that was growing into a
human being.72 Likely, Merrill-type cases will be rare, but criminal
protection of fetuses itself appears to be the norm. And while this area
of law is constantly evolving, the fact remains that at present this
evolution has favored criminal penalties for fetal murder.

Id. at 660.
See id. at 661.
65 See id. at 660.
66 See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Fetal Homicide Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid=14386 (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
67 These states are: Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Nevada, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington. Id.
68 These states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
69 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990).
70 Id. at 320.
7' Id. at 322.
72 Id. at 324.
63
64
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B. Tort Law
The right to recover in tort for injury to a fetus has followed a
trajectory similar to the criminal recognition of fetal murder. Until the
mid-twentieth century, the common law generally did not recognize
tort recovery for the unborn child. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton74 was the seminal case that established the old rule
that no recovery was available in tort for premature terminations of
pregnancies. In Dietrich, a pregnant woman slipped and fell due to
a "defect in a highway" she had been walking on.7 ' The fall caused
her to miscarry. The court, in an opinion by the famed Justice
Holmes, refused to allow the mother to recover for the loss of her
child's life.77 The court was concerned about setting the precedent
that someone might have a tort duty "to one not yet in being."78 It also
mused that the fetus was merely "a part of the mother," and that
any damages for injuries could be and should be recovered by her
directly. 79 Thus, the separate loss of the fetus was not yet viewed as
compensable.
This common law held until 1946, when the District of Columbia
recognized recovery for an infant who sustained injuries in utero due
to a negligent delivery in Bonbrest v. Kotz.80 The Bonbrest court took
issue with the Dietrich notion that the fetus was merely a part of the
mother's body, especially when the fetus was viable at time of
injury.8 ' The court therefore departed from the common law, and
allowed tort recovery out of concern for the "sacrosanct" rights one
has in the "possession and enjoyment of his life, his limbs and his

body." 82
Today, all jurisdictions recognize tort claims for a child's
83
prenatally inflicted injuries. However, the same legal issues courts
had with homicide statutes still prevail: is the fetus a "person" within
the wrongful death or harm statutes? Does the fetus have to be viable
at the time of the injury in order to pursue recovery?8 Although states
73

Klasing, supra note 22, at 934 & n.12.

74 138 Mass. 14 (1884), abrogated by Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446

(1967).
75 Id. at
76 Id. at

14.
14-15.
7 See id. at 17.
78 Id. at 16.
7 Id. at 17.
8 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. 1946).
81 Id. at 140.

Id. at 142.
See Klasing, supra note 22, at 935. While all jurisdictions allow recovery for infants
who are born alive, some also allow recovery for prenatal injuries resulting in stillbirths. Id.
4 See generally Buelow, supra note 21, at 979-84 (surveying the inconsistencies that
82

83
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previously applied the same born-alive rule that exists in criminal
law, most jurisdictions no longer require live birth for the purpose of
wrongful death actions. If a tortfeasor's negligent actions cause the
death of a fetus, either after birth or in the womb, that person is liable
for wrongful death. However, a large number of states still require
viability for the imposition of liability.86
II. THE RECONCILIATION
There is palpable discord between abortion rights, on the one hand,
and fetal murder and wrongful death statutes, which both cite the
fetus as a "person," on the other. Many believe that the right to
abortion exists only so long as the fetus is not a person. In fact,
dictum in Roe suggested that abortion rights necessarily depended
on the fetus not being a person under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Blackmun stated: "If [the] suggestion of personhood is
established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus's
right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth]
Amendment."8 8 With this in mind, it is not hard to see why many
abortion-rights activists shudder at the mention of a law that
recognizes the fetus as a "person." They fear that this sort of
declaration necessarily impinges on women's liberties by granting the
fetus a Fourteenth Amendment right to life (and thus, freedom from
abortion).89
Despite the seeming conflict, there are a number of reasons why
fetal murder laws do not threaten abortion rights. First, even though
fetal murder laws use the word "person," they do not confer
constitutional personhood. They confer only an artificial type of
personhood, one that is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
and that does not carry with it a "right to life." 90 Second, feticide laws

exist in current tort law regarding the legal status of the unborn fetus); Klasing, supra note 22, at
934-51 (examining the development of civil liability for fetal deaths).
8 Klasing, supra note 22, at 950-51; Wagner, supra note 19, at 1101.
86See Klasing, supra note 22, at 940-41 (noting that thirty-five states have replaced the
born-alive rule with a rule of viability).
87 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973).
8

Id.

89 A few scholars have countered this suggestion by arguing that, even if the fetus is a
person, abortion could still be constitutional. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 926 n.48 (1973) (arguing that even if
the fetus were a person, this would not mandate that the fetus win-courts would still have
to balance the rights of the woman against the rights of the fetus); Ramsey, supra note 16, at
754-65 (suggesting that, even if the fetus is a person, abortion may not be murder because
pregnant women could claim necessity or self-defense).
9 I pause here to point out that the purpose of this Note is not to take any normative
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are not grounded in fetal rights; they are based on the interests of
the state. States can, and do, act to protect certain entities, even when
those entities themselves have no rights. Moreover, whereas abortion
mediates between the opposing interests of the state and the woman,
feticide laws pursue the same goals for both the woman and the state.
In these scenarios, the state and the woman have similar interests, so
the state can be more aggressive about pursuing its goals. Finally,
there is a clear difference between a pregnant woman consenting to an
abortion and a nonconsensual attack on a woman that results in the
loss of her pregnancy. The woman has a right to act; the attacker does
not. Once we look below the surface, then, it becomes apparent that
fetal legislation need not be viewed as a threat to women's rights.
A. The PersonhoodMyth
1. Types of PersonhoodandAnalogy to CorporateLaw
Colloquially, personhood is an unequivocal, obvious notion.
Legally, it is a slippery, uncertain concept. There is no one legal
definition of "person." Nor has the Supreme Court ever given any
framework for personhood under the United States Constitution. 91
When confronted with the issue, the Court has typically dealt with
personhood in an ad-hoc fashion, granting or denying it in order
to achieve some desired social goal.92 For example, the Court
denied personhood status to slaves in Dred Scott v. Sandford.93 It
also denied personhood to fetuses in Roe v. Wade.94 On the other
stance on the issue of a fetus's right to life. The Note does not attempt to argue either that the
fetus should have constitutional personhood and a right to life, or that it should not. Rather, it
merely argues that, under the current state of the law, it does not.
91 Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for Legal
Personhood,59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 371 (2007).
9 Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of ConstitutionalPersonhood:
A Theory of Constitutional Personhoodfor Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. Rev.
1425, 1447 (1992) ("[M]ost Supreme Court cases implicitly grant or deny constitutional
personhood whenever specific constitutional rights are extended or denied.").
9 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Court found that slaves were "regarded as beings of an inferior order, . . .
and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." Id. at
407.
9 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). The Court reasoned that:
The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words. Section I of the
Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to "person." The first . .. speaks of
"persons born or naturalized in the United States." The word also appears both in the
Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause. "Person" is used in other
places in the Constitution . . .. But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word
is such that it has application only postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance,

862

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:3

hand, the Court has granted personhood to children for some
constitutional purposes.95 Most of the Court's decisions appear
merely result-oriented, and leave the legal community with no clear
definition of "personhood."96
Though the concept of personhood is a fuzzy one, the benefits of
legal personhood are clear. If a being (or entity) is considered a
person under the Fourteenth Amendment, then he (or it) is entitled to
certain rights. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state
may "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."97 These sacrosanct rights establish the
very high stakes of constitutional personhood battles.
Given the consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment, the very
term "person" in the fetal context appears to be an absolute affront
to abortion rights. After all, if the fetus is labeled "person," how
does it not automatically receive the right to live? The answer
depends entirely on what is meant by "person." Personhood is not a
one-dimensional construct. In fact, there are different types of legal
personhood, and not all of them fall within the Fourteenth
Amendment. In other words, the fetus can be a "person" in some
legal ways, but not a "person" of the type contemplated by the
Constitution. Thus, we can refer to the fetus as a person without
necessarily granting it a constitutional right to life.
Theories of personhood generally acknowledge two types of
persons: natural and juridical.98 Natural persons are the most obvious
type-you, me, your mother, father, neighbor, spouse, and the like.
Blackstone characterized natural persons to be those "[s]uch as the
God of nature formed us."99 Presently, natural persons include only

that it has any possible pre-natal application.
Id. at 157 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
9 See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70, 72 (1968) (overturning, on equal
protection grounds, a state law based on "the premise that illegitimate children are not
'nonpersons'); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone").
96Rivard, supra note 92, at 1450; see also Note, What We Talk About When We Talk
About Persons: The language of a Legal Fiction, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2001)
[hereinafter Language of a Legal Fiction](stating that judges do not have a consistent theory to
apply in the realm of personhood, and instead "approach[] it more as a legal conclusion than as
an open question").
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
9 Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos, supra note 91, at 372-74 (discussing the concepts of
both natural and juridical personhood).
9 1 wILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 119.

2010]

FETAL PERSONHOOD

863

human beings post-birth.'" Although it is difficult to say exactly
which rights attach to natural personhood,' 0 natural persons generally
receive full constitutional liberties1 02 and the highest level of legal
protection.10 3 Unlike juridical persons, natural persons do not have to
be judicially granted constitutional personhood because the status
attaches from birth."' It flows from humanity's "very dignity and
existence." 0 5 We are due the designation because of our inherent
moral nature, character, and worth. The rights of natural persons are
"ve[s]ted in them by the immutable laws of nature."1os Ultimately,
then, the natural person is an entity with full entitlement under the
Constitution, one whose rights and status vest automatically because
of what nature morally recognizes the entity to be.107
Juridical persons, on the other hand, are entities, other than born
human beings, to whom the law gives protections that are similar
to those protections given to natural persons.108 Juridical persons
are also known as "artificial" persons. 109 This category includes
corporations and other collective bodies such as governments and

1
0oBerg, Of Elephants and Embryos, supra note 91, at 374 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 158 (1973)); Rivard, supra note 92, at 1450.
101
See Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REv. 195,
198-99 (1996). Ducor does suggest that, at a minimum, the rights of natural personhood include
"the right to due process, the right to own property, the right to bodily integrity, the right to live,
and the right not to be owned." Id. (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, Blackstone argued
that the primary rights of natural personhood are "the right of personal security, the right of
personal liberty; and the right of private property." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*125.

'0 2 Of course, the government reserves the ability to limit rights for good reason, so long as
due process is given. For instance, prisoners are persons, but clearly have limited rights. See
Ducor, supra note 101, at 199. Thus, while all natural persons are at least born with a right to
full constitutional liberty, these liberties can either be postponed (as in the case of minority) or
removed when necessary to promote superseding interests.
10 3 See Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos, supra note 91, at 373 ("Certain legal rights
adhere automatically upon birth, and the designation of 'natural person' may be taken as
shorthand for identifying entities that are entitled to the maximum protection under the law.").
4
1 See id.
05
Ducor, supra note 101, at 199.

106
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES *120.
07Throughout this Note, this definition applies when the term "natural person" is used.

Not all scholars agree with this approach, however. Professor Jessica Berg, for instance,
believes that natural personhood can also attach to an entity because of the rights other persons
have in that entity. See Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos, supra note 91, at 377-79. This Note
also argues that personhood can attach in this way, but sees this as an instance of juridical, not
natural, personhood. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 123-33.
08
See Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos, supra note 91, at 373 ("Corporations are the best
example of Uuridical persons], but juridical persons may also include other entities.").
1 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 119 ("Persons also are divided by the
law into either natural persons, or artificial. . . . [A]rtificial are such as created and devised by
human laws for the purposes of society and government; which are called corporations or bodies
politic.").
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labor unions.' 10 Since juridical persons are not natural persons, the
law does not give them equal rights or protections. They are creatures
of the state, and as such are limited to whatever rights the state
chooses to give or not give them.' Unfortunately, because juridical
personhood is often applied by courts without a framework or
rationale, it is difficult to determine the rules and reasons for
conferring juridical personhood." 2
Typically, though, juridical personhood is a result-oriented status,
the desired result being to confer material benefit upon a natural,
human person. For instance, most corporate personality literature
reveals that the juridical personhood of corporations derives from the
need to recognize the rights of natural persons, not the desire to exalt
the corporate form.' 13 Ultimately, the key distinction between natural
and juridical persons turns on why the law recognizes an entity's
personhood status in the first place. In some cases, the law grants
personhood because of the entity's interests (creating natural
persons), and in other cases, the law grants personhood because of the
interests natural persons have in the entity (creating juridical persons).
Because corporations are among the most well-known juridical
persons,114 an analogy to corporate personality should be instructive.
The law has long afforded corporations juridical person status.'
Such awards were often quick and unjustified. Before hearing the
parties' arguments in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific
Railroad Co., 116 Chief Justice Waite instructed: "The court does not
wish to hear argument on the question whether the . . . Fourteenth
Amendment . . . applies to . . . corporations. We are all of [the]

opinion that it does."'"7 Although the earliest courts generally did
not explain their reasons for granting juridical personhood to
corporations, later courts and scholars did. One of the earliest
rationales for granting juridical personhood was the need to protect
shareholders as the owners of the company.118 Although the company,
10 See Natasha N. Aljalian, Note, Fourteenth Amendment Personhood: Fact or Fiction?,
73 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 495, 500-02 (1999).
11See Berg, OfElephants and Embryos, supra note 91, at 400.
2
l See id. at 380 ("Unlike the designation of natural person, there appear to be few, if any,
legally established limitations either on what kind of entity can be labeled a 'juridical person,'
or what rights follow."); Language ofa Legal Fiction,supra note 96, at 1747 (noting the lack of
a "theoretically unified judicial approach to legal personality").
113Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos, supra note 91, at 382.
14See

id. at 373.

See, e.g., Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181
(1888); Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); County of San Mateo v. S.
Pac. R.R. Co. (The RailroadTax Cases), 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
116118 U.S. 394.
" 7 Id. at 396.
118 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporationin American Legal Thought, 76
"s
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as an artificial entity, had no rights itself, the shareholders had
personal property rights in the company that needed protection.1 19 In
The Railroad Tax Cases,120 Justice Field observed that "[t]o deprive
the corporation of its property, or to burden it, is, in fact, to deprive
the corporators of their property or to lessen its value." 2 1 Courts
were, in effect, granting personhood to a non-person entity in order to
protect the natural person owners of the non-person entity. This is
precisely the picture of the juridical person: an entity that derives
its personhood not from the moral status or rights of the entity itself,
but from the rights and interests of already existing natural persons.12 2
Fetal personhood can be perceived in much the same way. The
fetus, like the corporation, is not entitled to protections because of
what it is innately. Instead, the law recognizes that there is a natural
person, the mother, who has fundamental interests at stake. Her rights
are invested in another entity, the fetus. The law gives that entity
juridical personhood to ensure that the rights of the mother may be
secured, just as the law gives the corporation juridical personhood to
protect the rights of the shareholders.' 3
Fetal personality, like corporate personhood, is also outcome
oriented. Corporate personality theory often holds that "person" is a
legal fiction; it means whatever the law wants it to mean.124 In this
way, courts were able to characterize corporations as persons in order

GEO. L.J. 1593, 1641 (1988).
9See id. (observing that granting "personhood" to corporations helped guarantee "that the
owners of property held in the name of a corporation would receive the same constitutional
protections as the owners of property held in their own name").
Mo13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
121Id. at 747.
22
1 But see id. at 381-82 (again arguing that juridical personhood may stem from the rights
of the entity itself). Again, this Note departs from Professor Berg's framework for legal
personhood, instead contending that the reason for conferring personhood (whether due to the
entity itself having interests or other natural persons having interests in the entity) must be a part
of what distinguishes natural and juridical personhood. It would make no sense to turn the
distinction entirely on whether or not the entity is human; fetuses are not natural persons, but are
clearly genetically human. To then begin classifying this personhood based on what kinds of
human beings (born or not born, etc.) count as persons merely begs the question of what
constitutes a natural person in the first place. Finally, it seems odd to speak of some juridical
entities as having interests. When we say that a corporation has interests, we are really saying
that its shareholders' and officers' (natural persons) have interests in the corporation.
23
This Note does not mean to assert that the interests are also the same, i.e., that the
mother, like the corporation, is protecting mere property interests. Some scholars do argue for
this approach. See, e.g., Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to
Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 159, 159-60 (2005); Ducor, supra note 101, at
206-08, 210. However, the analogy is equally applicable if it is assumed that the mother is
protecting her fundamental reproductive rights, rather than her property rights.
24
1 See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE
L.J. 655, 655 (1926) ("[P]ut roughly, 'person' signifies what law makes it signify.").
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to achieve a desired outcome.125 As Blackstone wrote long ago,
"artificial [persons] are such as created and devised by human laws
for the purposes of society."2 The way we define "person," then,
depends on the consequences society wishes to achieve from such a
designation.127 The personhood comes from the desire for a specific
result, not from the metaphysical characteristics of the entity.128 The
desired outcome for a corporation is to protect the rights of its
shareholders. Similarly, society hopes to achieve social good by
conferring juridical personhood on fetuses. Such a designation will
reduce violence against women, vindicate women's rights, provide
for monetary recovery through wrongful death awards, and punish
criminal assailants. Society defines in order to achieve a certain social
state, not to recognize an existing social being.
Limitations on fetal personhood also mirror the limitations on
corporate personhood. Because the impetus for the designation is not
the nature of the thing, but the desired social result, states are free to
limit personhood designations as they see fit. This limitation is a
consequence of the artificial entity theory of corporate personality.12 9
The artificial entity theory holds that the corporation is merely "a
creature of state law, entitled only to rights the state chooses to grant,
and subject to the removal of those rights."l 30 In essence, juridical
personhood applies only insofar as it is needed to solve the problem
or achieve the social good at hand.131 This is why corporations receive
some, but not all, property, due process, equal protection, and other
personhood rights.1 32 For instance, the corporation cannot vote, it has
no right to bear arms, and it is not protected against Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination.133 None of those rights would be necessary to a
corporation's ability to sue in order to protect its assets in court. In the
same way, fetal personhood need not be seen as a threat to Roe
because it is limited to whatever legal capacities are needed in order
to secure the discrete rights of the fetus's mother. Arguably, all the
12See Rivard, supra note 92, at 1450-51 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision to
grant corporations personhood was purely pragmatic and results oriented).
1261 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *119 (emphasis added).
127This type of definition is discussed by Dewey, supra note 124, at 660-61. But see
Sanford A. Schane, The CorporationIs a Person: The Language ofa Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L.
REv. 563, 594 (1987) (arguing that the Supreme Court must have taken into account the
similarities between corporations and natural persons when deciding to confer personhood upon
corporations).
128
See Dewey, supra note 124, at 661 ("[I]t is a matter of analysis of facts, not of search
for an inhering essence.").
11329 See Rivard, supra note 92, at 1456.
0 Id.
'3l See Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos, supra note 91, at 380-81.
32

1

33

1

See Rivard, supra note 92, at 1452-53.
See id. at 1454-55.
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mother needs to vindicate those rights are penalties against the
transgressor and recovery for loss. Feticide and fetal wrongful death
statutes achieve both of these goals without reaching beyond their
ken.
These different personhood theories help categorize fetal
personhood so as not to conflict with reproductive rights. The law
may call the fetus a person, but it does not mean a naturalperson with
all of the guaranteed constitutional liberties (namely, the right to life).
Instead, it refers to juridical personhood, a designation stemming not
from the essence of the fetus but from the need to protect the interests
of an existing natural person, the mother. The designation is based
purely on desired consequences, and its reach can be limited as
needed to achieve those discrete consequences. The key, then, is this:
the law can logically refer to the fetus as a "person" and, at the same
time, not grant it a constitutional right to life.
2. The Supremacy Clause: A Legal Trump Card
Even if a legislature wanted to create full fetal personhood, it
would be without power to do so. Simply put: fetal laws do not confer
personhood upon the fetus because procedurally, they cannot. No
legislature is free to promulgate legislation that is incompatible with
the federal Constitution; the Constitution is the "supreme Law of the
Land."1 34 The Supreme Court has already made clear that the fetus
is not a "person" 5 under the Constitution, and thus is not entitled to
protection from deprivation of "life, liberty, . . . [or] equal protection
of the laws."' Legislatures cannot declare otherwise, since this
would be in derogation of the Constitution, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade.137
Thus, if a legislature attempted to establish natural fetal
personhood, its law would simply have no effect unless Roe's
essential holding was overturned. The Constitution is what the Court
says it iS,13 8 and legislatures are bound by the Constitution. 139 This is
true regardless of whether the offending statute is a state statute or a
federal statute such as the Unborn Victims of Violence Act.14 0
134U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
326-27 (1819) ("The constitution .. .declares, that the constitution itself, and the laws passed in
of its provisions, shall be the supreme law of the land. . .
pursuance
35
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
136U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
137Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
138Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (establishing the principle of judicial
review, that the courts have the power to decide whether a law conflicts with the Constitution).
139See sources cited supra note 134.
o 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006).
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Congress cannot pass legislation that is inconsistent with the
Constitution any more than a state can. Congress has no power to
contradict the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution,'41
and the states cannot contradict any federal law at all 42 (including the
Constitution and its judicial interpretations). Ultimately, despite their
best efforts, neither Congress nor any state may declare the fetus to
be a natural person with Fourteenth Amendment rights.14 3 Quite
plainly, a legislature cannot "add[] new persons to the constitutional
population."'" Because constitutional law is already settled on fetal
non-personhood, and since the Supremacy Clause upholds the
Constitution over all other law, no fetal personhood statute can have
an effect that is contrary to Roe.145 Professor Ronald Dworkin puts it
best: "If a fetus is not part of the constitutional population, under the
national constitutional arrangement, then states have no power to
overrule that national arrangement by themselves declaring that
fetuses have rights competitive with the constitutional rights of
pregnant women." 46 Legislatures may speak as they wish, but the
Supremacy Clause prevents their words from having any practical
effect.
This argument is not purely theoretical; the Supreme Court has
already reviewed statutory fetal personhood language and agreed that
the language does not offend the Constitution. In 1986, the Missouri
legislature passed a law declaring that "[t]he life of each human being
begins at conception" 4 7 and that the state shall "acknowledge on
behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the
rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens,
and residents of this state." 48 Soon after the passage of this act, a
group of abortion providers, including Planned Parenthood, brought
141 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (overturning the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act as applied to state and local governments because it
exceeded Congress's enforcement power, as interpreted by the Court, under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
142 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raisch, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) ("The Supremacy Clause
unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law
shall prevail.").
43
1 See Walen, supra note 19, at 173-74 (stating that Congress may not define fetuses as
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment).
144 Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled,
59 U. CHI. L. REv. 381,400 (1992).
45
1 See id. ("[Sbo long as [a] law does not purport to curtail constitutional rights . . . a
declaration that a fetus is a person raises no more constitutional difficulties than states raise
when they declare, as every state has, that corporations are legal persons . . . .").
146Id. at 401. Though Professor Dworkin is speaking about states, Congress is equally
powerless to overrule the "national constitutional arrangement." See supra note 143 and
accompanying text.
147Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205(1)(1) (West 2000).
48
1 Id. § 1.205(2).

2010]

FETAL PERSONHOOD

869

suit challenging the law as an unconstitutional restriction on abortion
services and privacy rights.14 9 In upholding the statute, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the law was merely enforcing tort and probate
50
protections for fetuses, and that it could "do no more than that."',
The Court stated that the Missouri legislature was simply expressing a
"value judgment" through its statutory language.15I States are free to
communicate their opinions on when life begins. 152 However, such
opinions do not confer personhood or challenge abortion rights. They
are merely value judgments that do not, and because of the
Supremacy Clause, cannot, threaten abortion jurisprudence.' 5 3
3. One Word, Many Definitions
Those who assume that feticide laws and abortion rights are
irreconcilable overlook the fact that one word can have different
meanings in different settings. They assume that if a state categorizes
a fetus as a "person" under one discrete statute, the state must be
designating the fetus a full, natural, and moral person in all settingsthus laying the foundation for fetal rights and abortion challenges. But
wishing does not make it so. As Professor Walter Wheeler Cook
warned long ago:
The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or
more legal rules, and so in connection with more than one
purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in
all of them ... has all the tenacity of original sin and must
constantly be guarded against. 154
The meaning of a word, especially one as nebulous and loaded as
"person," depends largely on narrow statutory context, and not broad
lay connotations.
When the Roe Court first took on the question of whether a fetus
was a person under the Fourteenth Amendment, it was only
concerned with a narrow interpretation of the word as used in the
Constitution.'5 5 Justice Blackmun looked first at the legal treatment
of abortion during and after the ratification of the Fourteenth
49

1 See Webster
1o Id. at 506.
51

v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1989).

1 1Id.
152 See id.
153Id.
154Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE

L.J. 333,
337 (1933).
55
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (noting that an unborn child is not a "person"
as that word is used in the Fourteenth Amendment).

870

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:3

Amendment.156 Then he looked to the Constitution for an
interpretation of the word "person" and found that, although the
Constitution gives no definition, it uses the word only in a postnatal
sense.157 Essentially, Justice Blackmun's inquiry was two-fold: (1)
whether the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment would have
considered the fetus a person and (2) whether the rest of the
Constitution in fact considered the fetus a person. He was applying
general principles of construction to interpret a word in one, and only
one, context: the Fourteenth Amendment.'5 8 Pro-life and pro-choice
advocates should take such care today when considering the import of
the word "person" as used in state fetal laws. Its meaning comes from
legislative history and purpose, and applies only within that same
legislation.
Another example may be illustrative. Consider Inyo County
v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Community of the Bishop
Colony,159 where the Supreme Court had to interpret a contextualized
use of the word "person." The Court was faced with the task of
determining whether a Native American tribe constituted a "person"
under the federal § 1983 civil rights statute. 160 Justice Ginsburg
held that resolution of the issue did not depend "upon a bare analysis
of the word 'person,', 1 6 1 but instead on "the legislative environment"
surrounding the statute.162 The Court determined that the purpose of
the statute was not consistent with a determination that the tribe
counted as a "person," and it therefore declined to adopt such an
interpretation.163 The majority also recognized that "the meaning of
the same words well may vary to meet the purposes of the law." 1 6"
Thus, it would be foolhardy for us to extrapolate constitutional
personhood from the designation of a fetus as a person under a state
criminal or tort statute. The purposes and implications of federal
constitutional law are very different from those of state criminal and
tort law. State fetal laws have a discrete social purpose. The laws
punish violence against women, hold criminal defendants responsible
for the full import of their acts, and recognize the rights of a mother
in carrying her pregnancy to term. The Fourteenth Amendment,
'56Id. at 129-52.
57
Id. at 157.
58

See id. at 158.

'9 538 U.S. 701 (2003).
id. at 704.
16oSee
'61 Id. at 711 (quoting Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 317 (1978)).
62
1 Id. (quoting Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 161 (1942)).
63

1

Id. at 712.

164

Id. at 711 (quoting United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 213

(2001)).
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however, is a civil rights amendment that was enacted after the
Civil War with the broad goal of establishing the full rights of
constitutional personhood for those that did not already have them,
namely, former slaves.16 5 Feticide laws are not in place to establish
the general rights of personhood, or even to define who counts as a
person for purposes of the Constitution. 166 Indeed, courts have already
recognized the discrete purposes of fetal laws. 6 7 For instance, the
Supreme Court of Illinois rejected an argument that Illinois' feticide
statute conflicted with its abortion statute, writing that the Fourteenth
Amendment, as applied to abortion, is about "a woman's right of
privacy," whereas feticide statutes are about "protect[ing] a pregnant
mother and her unborn child from the intentional wrongdoing of a
third party."16 8 Simply put, just because two different sources of law
(here, fetal homicide statutes and the Constitution) both use the same
word ("person") does not also mean that they both imply the same
meaning of the word. That a fetus is a person for the purpose of state
homicide charges does not make it a true, constitutional person.
Those who advocate or bemoan such state legislation should beware
their "tendency to forget the purpose of a classification and to assume
without adequate discussion that a given word

. .

.

has the same

meaning in a number of different rules."l 69
States themselves already recognize that a statutory personhood
designation only goes so far. In Wartelle v. Women's and Children's
Hospital, Inc.,170 the Supreme Court of Louisiana observed that
"person" could mean one thing in one statute, and another thing
within a different statute. In Wartelle, the plaintiff mother went to the
defendant hospital to deliver her child.' 7 ' Due to poor monitoring by
the hospital staff, the child was stillborn.17 2 The parents filed both a
survival action and a wrongful death action against the hospital. 73
The Supreme Court of Louisiana decided that, although a fetus was a
person under the Louisiana wrongful death statute,174 it was not a
person for purposes of a survival action,17 5 even though the two
165Aljalian,

supra note 110, at 496-97.
course, this does not stop certain legislators or pro-life groups from claiming, for the
purposes of their agendas, that the laws do exactly that. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 16, at 723
& n.9.
167See, e.g., People v. Shum, 512 N.E.2d 1183 (111. 1987).
1MId. at 1199-1200.
69
Cook, supra note 154, at 338.
o 704 So. 2d 778, 782, 784 (La. 1997).
'71 Id. at 779.
16Of

172Id

7

3Id.

74

1

Id. at 782.
782, 784.

1"Id. at
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claims are closely intertwined.176 The court was willing to consider
the fetus a person for the purposes of only one statute. No meaning
beyond that one statute was implied.
If the personhood designation in Wartelle could not even be
extrapolated from a wrongful death action to a survival action, how
can it possibly carry its meaning all the way to the United States
Constitution? The Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly realized
that "the classification of 'person' is made solely for the purpose of
facilitating determinations about the attachment of legal rights and
duties," and that it is not a "moral or philosophical judgment on the
value of the fetus."1 77 In other words, classifying a fetus in one statute
does not determine what the status of the fetus is in a broader sense.178
States passing fetal homicide laws actually make significant efforts
to avoid being in conflict with abortion jurisprudence. Many,
including California, condemn feticide without classifying the fetus as
a person or human being. 17 9 The California murder statute reads, in
part: "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus,
with malice aforethought."18 0 The drafting is not sloppy: the obvious
implication is that California intended to indicate that the fetus was a
separate entity, apart from a human being, that is protected from
destruction. In fact, California courts have held that other statutes that
include merely the words "human being" specifically do not apply
to fetuses.18 ' For example, the California manslaughter statute states
simply that "[m]anslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice."l 82 The California Supreme Court made clear that this
"human being" statute explicitly does not apply to fetuses, writing:
"[T]he unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice
aforethought is murder, but only the unlawful killing of a human
being can constitute manslaughter. There is no crime in California of
manslaughter of a fetus."' 83 Thus, at least in the state homicide laws,
California intended to clearly distinguish between human beings on
the one hand and fetuses on the other. This allows the state to punish
76
' See id. at 781 (noting that, although wrongful death and survivorship actions arise from
a common tort, they are actually "separate and distinct" actions).
1"Id. at 780.
178See, e.g., People v. Davis, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 103 (Ct. App. 1993) ("While a previable
fetus may not be a person for purposes of due process comparison with other fundamental
rights, we see no impediment to the Legislature's enlargement of the crime of 'murder' to
include feticide."), affd, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
179See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2008).
so Id. (emphasis added).
181See, e.g., People v. Dennis, 17 Cal. 4th 468, 506 (1998) (holding that manslaughter
does not apply to fetuses).
12CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 2008) (emphasis added).
183People v. Dennis, 17 Cal. 4th at 506 (internal citations omitted).

2010]

FETAL PERSONHOOD

873

feticide but avoid the classification of the fetus as a full-on "human
being."
Other states, such as Kentucky and Louisiana, also distinguish the
murder of a fetus from the murder of a person, but do so by drafting
entirely new statutes to condemn the separate crime of feticide.'8
Over sixty percent of states with fetal murder laws designate the fetus
as a "human being" and not a "person" to avoid the personhood
issue. In many instances, then, state statutes fail to even implicate
personhood in the charge of feticide.
The majority of feticide laws also explicitly make an exception for
abortion and refuse to punish any actions taken by the pregnant
mother herself. Maryland does so frankly: "Nothing in [this fetal
murder statute] applies to or infringes on a woman's right to
terminate a pregnancy." 18 6 Similarly, Kentucky law provides that fetal
homicide does not apply to "acts [that] were committed ... [d]uring
any abortion . . . [or] to any acts of a pregnant woman that caused

the death of her unborn child."1 87 Wisconsin's fetal murder statute
likewise sets out that the law does not apply to any act "committed
during an induced abortion."188 Even Missouri, whose statutes have
arguably the most pro-life language of all fetal laws, 189 proclaims that
it will not act in abrogation of the Constitution or the decisions of the
Supreme Court.1 90 It would be strange to assume that laws which
explicitly recognize abortion rights somehow craftily undermine
them.
Ultimately, the word "person" is a legal term of art.191 To say that
it means the same thing in all contexts "would be to argue that
because a wine is called 'dry,' it has the properties of dry solids." 9 2
The term has no obvious or ordinary legal meaning, and courts must
therefore construe it "in light of [the] purpose for which [a] statute
14See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507A.020-.030 (West 2006) (denominating fetal homicide
as a different crime than murder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5 (2002) (defining feticide as its
own separate crime).
185Ramsey, supra note 16, at 737.
86
' MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 2-103(d) (LexisNexis 2002).
87
' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §507A.010(2)-(3) (West 2006).
188WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.75(2)(b)(1) (West 2005).
189
See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 741 (noting that the Missouri statute "defines an 'unborn
child' as a 'person' for purposes of homicide ... and does not contain an explicit exception for
abortion").
'See Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.010 (2000) (noting the state legislature's intent to regulate
"to the full extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States [and] decisions of the
United States Supreme Court").
191
Cf Wartelle v. Women's & Children's Hosp., Inc., 704 So. 2d 778, 782 (La. 1997)
(holding that a fetus was a "person" under the state wrongful death statute but not the state
survival action statute).
'9 Dewey, supranote 124, at 656.
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was passed."1 9 3 Since different statues have different objectives, what
counts as a person for statute X may not count as a person for statute
Y. This is especially so when a term is used in different pieces of
legislation by two completely different legislative bodies (i.e., a state
legislature and the federal Congress). Though the bodies use the
same word, they do not necessarily apply the same meaning to that
word. States may thus label a fetus as a person for any number of
their laws, but this interpretation goes no farther than that specific
state and its own statutes. It does not have implications for the
meaning of "person" under the United States Constitution.
4. PersonhoodIs Categorization,Not Recognition
Fetal personhood designations are purely semantic. While states
categorize the fetus in particular scenarios as it suits them, they do
not recognize a general fetal status. If the fetus were generally
considered a constitutional person, we would expect to see the law
take a top-down approach. Courts and legislatures would begin with
the maxim that the fetus is a full person and interpret or pass all laws
accordingly. As discussed, this is not what most states are doing.
Courts and legislatures do not ask once "Is the fetus a person?" and
then apply their "Yes" or "No" answer uniformly to every situation
they encounter. 194 Instead, they ask again and again, "Is the fetus a
personfor the purposes of this statute?" It is those purposes that drive
the laws, not the fetuses themselves. The fetus is recognized as a
juridical entity that may be categorized as X or Y depending on the
societal good that will result.
Again, consider California. The California homicide statute
includes the killing of a fetus as murder. 195 The California
manslaughter statute, however, does not. 19 6 Can we then claim that
California is establishing natural fetal personhood, and waging war
on Roe and its progeny? Certainly not. If California enacted its
murder statute because of some moral notion that the fetus is a full
constitutional person, then all state statutes would fall in line with
this notion, and they clearly do not. The explanation must be that
California, and other states like it, are not imposing or even
19 3

O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 909 (Mo. 1983) (finding that, in light of
legislative objectives, a fetus was a "person" under the Missouri wrongful death statute).
94
Arguably, there are some outliers, such as Missouri, which does attempt to impose a
uniform treatment of the fetus throughout its entire code. Mo. REv. STAT. § 1.205(2) (2000)
(stating that "[u]nbom children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being").
95
1 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2008).
196See CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West 2008); see also People v. Dennis, 17 Cal. 4th 468,
506 (1998) (stating that California does not recognize fetal manslaughter, only fetal murder).
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recognizing fetal personhood; instead, they are categorizing in order
to achieve discrete social benefits in narrow circumstances.
Imagine a new state, State X, has recently come into being and is
developing a penal code. State X has a big crime problem: its
criminals are rampantly killing both citizens and pet dogs. The
legislature decides to do something about this problem. It passes a
murder statute, which states in part: "The killing of a person is
murder." Imagine that the state's supreme court, in line with
documented legislative intent, subsequently decides that a pet dog
counts as a "person" under the murder statute. Either one of two
things has happened here. First, the state may have acted because it
believes that pet dogs are so morally similar to humankind that they,
are actually and innately persons. Second, and considerably more
likely, the state acted because it wanted to achieve a noble good: to
stop the killing of pets. Undeniably, this second possibility shows that
the state clearly values dogs, and places considerable importance on
their life and worth. What it does not mean, however, is that the
state is recognizing dogs as "persons" in any natural, much less
constitutional, sense of the word. The state is merely categorizing. It
is using an easily applicable and pre-existing mode of punishment to
reach its goals. Categorization does not confer personhood rights.
Similarly, when states punish feticide as murder or categorize the
unborn as "persons," they punish a bad act, they protect pregnant
women, and they work towards a laudable social goal. They do not,
however, give fetuses personhood rights any more than State X
created full dog personhood.
B. Why Fetal Statutes Are Not at Odds with Roe
1. What Roe Recognizes
To understand why fetal statutes do not conflict with Roe, one
must first look, in general terms, at what the seminal abortion cases
did and did not do. Roe v. Wade established a trimester framework
for abortion regulation.197 During the first trimester, the state cannot
interfere with a woman's ultimate choice to obtain an abortion.198
Past the point of fetal viability, however, Roe gives states the right to
regulate and even prohibit abortion. 199 In Planned Parenthood of

410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
Id. at 164.
'Id. at 164-65. However, the states are not allowed to do so if abortion is necessary to
protect the life or health of the mother. Id. at 165.
19

98

'
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,200 the Supreme Court again
upheld the right of the mother to choose abortion pre-viability and the
right of the state to regulate or proscribe abortion post-viability. 201
Both cases recognize that states have an "important and legitimate
interest in potential life." 202 Although this interest does not become
compelling enough to override the mother's right to privacy and
203
states still have interests in
abortion until the point of viability,
fetal life throughout the duration of the pregnancy. 204 What neither
decision states, however, is that the fetus has an interest in life. The
interests belong to the state, not the fetus. In their strictest terms, Roe
and Casey are not cases pitting fetal rights against women's rights.
Instead, they put women's rights up against the government's
interests. The Supreme Court explicitly described the fetus as a
"potential life," and made no mention of the rights of such a potential
human. As Professor Jed Rubenfeld noted, the fetus has at most
"potential interests," which are those "interests that the potential life
would have if it became actual."2 05 By designating the fetus as
potential, and not actual, life, the Court implicitly denied the notion
that fetal rights are at stake. "A potential thing cannot be said to
possess the very attributes that distinguish it from the actual."2 06 The
only interest that can trump women's privacy is a state's compelling
interest in potential life, not a fetus's interest in actual life. In sum:
(1) the state has an interest in fetal life, but the fetus does not have its
own interest in life; and (2) that right exists throughout pregnancy and
is only limited by the competing rights of the mother herself. 207
2. DetachedState Action: The State as the Holder of Rights
Perhaps part of the inability of commentators to reconcile abortion
rights with fetal laws is that they assume that when states legislate
to protect potential life, they do so on behalf of the potential
life. Actually, when a state legislates about the fetus, it does not
20505 U.S. 833 (1992).
20 See id. at 846.

202Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 ("[T]he State has legitimate
interests ... in protecting ... the life of the fetus that may become a child.").
203 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
204 Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. This means that the state has a cognizable interest in fetal life
even pre-viability. See id. (noting that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the life of
the fetus "from the outset of the pregnancy"); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,
519 (1989) ("[W]e do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential human life should
come into existence only at the point of viability . . . .").
20 5
Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition That "Life Begins at
Conception," 43 STAN. L. REv. 599, 612 (1991) (emphasis in original).
206

Id.

207

See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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necessarily do so for the fetus, but for itself. Roe and Casey both
recognize that the state has its own legitimate interests in potential
life. Professor Ronald Dworkin has termed this kind of state action
"detached," as opposed to "derivative," action.208 He notes that states
209
may assert two very different motives for criminalizing murder.
First, they may act derivatively, in order to protect the rights of
21
citizens for the citizens.210 Here the state acts because the citizen
himself has rights to assert, and the state is a vehicle for the protection
of the citizen's own natural liberties. In contrast, the state may also
act detachedly, to protect human life as a good in and of itself, "quite
apart from its value to the person whose life it is." 2 1 1 If the state is
acting derivatively in passing fetal legislation, then yes, the state may
212
be assuming the fetus has rights already. But this is not necessarily
the case. The state can act in its detached capacity, where it takes the
same action without recognizing any rights in the object of its law.
Therefore, feticide statutes do not automatically imply a grant of fetal
rights. They simply suggest a state assertion of interest in fetal life.
The state can assert its own interests, apart from any the fetus may or
may not have. 2 13 It is entirely possible, then, as Roe and Casey both
recognize, that states can protect fetuses even in the complete absence
of fetal rights.
3. ProtectionDoes Not Imply Personhood
In the same vein, to reconcile abortion rights with fetal laws, we
must recognize the simple principle that merely protecting an entity
from destruction does not mean that the entity itself has rights.
Natural tendency may be to assume that if a state protects an
entity from death, it must be doing so because that entity has a right
to life. However, the state can, and legitimately does, protect
214
Personhood is not a prerequisite to
non-persons from destruction.
state protective action; being a non-person does not equate to being
a "legal nonentity."2 15 The Eleventh Circuit recognized that fetal
208Dworkin, supra note 144, at 396.
209 Id.
210Id.
211
2 12

Id.

Id. at 397.

See Rubenfeld, supra note 205, at 610 (noting that a state has several identifiable
interests in the potential life of a fetus that are independent of any rights that the fetus may
have).
2 14
See Dworkin, supra note 144, at 402.
215 See, e.g., O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Mo. 1983) (holding that Roe does
not mandate that a fetus be considered a non-person or "legal nonentity" under state wrongful
death statutes). The late Professor John Hart Ely also pressed the point that even non-persons
deserve protection: "Come to think of it, draft cards aren't persons either." Ely, supra note 89, at
213
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. to whether a state can prohibit

the destruction of a fetus."2 16 This is because the state can have
interests in non-persons, and destruction of those non-persons may
offend these state interests to such a degree that the state has a
legitimate reason to act.217
Take, for example, endangered species laws. One cannot kill an
endangered species,2 18 but that does not automatically make the
animal a possessor of rights, much less a "person." After all, we still
lock endangered species in zoos without giving them "due process."
Instead, what is at work here is the state protecting its own interests.
The state takes an independent interest in the preservation of our
planet and its wildlife. It is not acting as a surrogate for mother earth
to assert her own rights.2 19
We can view fetal murder laws in the same light. Communities
have an important interest in "protecting the sanctity of life [and
acknowledging] that human life in any form has enormous intrinsic
value." 22 0 These ideals promote compassion and welfare. Upholding
these ideals does not mean that the object of destruction has rights,
just that the state hopes to achieve a social good by prohibiting the
object's termination. Roe explicitly gave states the right to pursue
such social goals with regard to fetuses: the Court clearly asserted that
the state can have a "detached" interest in fetal life.2 21 When we
recognize that feticide laws express that state interest, instead of any
interest of the fetus itself, it again becomes clear that fetal murder
laws do not challenge abortion rights.
4. The Woman and the State Are Not at Odds
Another central tenet of abortion case law helps elucidate how
fetal murder laws do not conflict with abortion jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court has concluded that the state interest in potential life
exists throughout pregnancy and is limited only by the rights of the

926.

216 Smith v. Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386, 1388 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that Roe is not at
odds with the feticide statute at issue).
217See Rubenfeld, supra note 205, at 609 ("[T]he killing or destruction of things other than
persons can [also] impinge on state interests to such a degree that the state may prohibit conduct
otherwise protected by constitutional rights.").
218See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006) (prtecting endangered species from extinction).
219
For instance, federal endangered species laws mention the nation's interests, not the
species's own interests. See id. at § 1531(a)(3) (providing that the law is based upon the finding
that "these species . . . are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and
scientific value to the Nation and its people").
22 0
Dworkin, supra note 144, at 408.
221 See supra notes 208-213 and accompanying text.
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woman. 2 22 Abortion is a balancing act: whoever's rights are the most
compelling gets to make the decision. Fetal statutes, in contrast, do
not deal with this balance. When a pregnant woman is the victim of
violence and loses her pregnancy, her rights are not at odds with the
interests of the state. Both have the same goal of protecting the
potential life. Where there is no conflict with the mother's autonomy,
the state may act as it wishes to vindicate its recognized interests in
fetal life, and its action does not implicate Roe.223 As one scholar has
observed, "[Iln those settings where the state's interest in potential
life is not counterpoised by any individual's constitutionally-protected
interest, the state's interest could easily prevail."224 If the mother is
not interested in abortion, and her rights are not in play to limit the
state interest, the state may act to protect the potential life at any
point, without challenging reproductive rights.225
Courts have already used this line of reasoning when asked to
rule against fetal personhood designations. Many decisions have
recognized that limits on the state apply only when the mother's
autonomy is at issue, which is not the case with fetal murder laws.226
In Smith v. Newsome, 22 the Eleventh Circuit refused to find a
Georgia feticide statute at odds with Roe. The defendant in Newsome
claimed that the statue was unconstitutional because it contradicted
Roe's holding that a fetus was not a person under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 28 The court quickly and easily dismissed this argument,
claiming that Roe's holding was "immaterial" as applied to the case
at bar.22 9 The court observed:
The constitutional limitations upon a state's right to prohibit
the destruction of a fetus come into play when the state's
222Planned

Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
See Patricia A. King, The JuridicalStatus of the Fetus: A Proposalfor Legal Protection
of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1678 (1979) ("Where the protectable interests of fully
mature members [of society] do not conflict with those of less mature members, there is no
justification for ignoring the latter's claims.... In tort, property, and criminal law, when that
interest does not oppose a protected interest of the mature mother, the state should not hesitate
to vindicate it.").
224 Jeffrey A. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the
Potentialityof Human Life, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 112 (1985).
225
In fact, as I will argue later on, feticide statutes actually promote the reproductive
interests of the mother. See infra Part 1H.
226 See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1990) (upholding the
constitutionality of unborn child homicide statutes because the statutes "seek to protect the
'potentiality of human life,' and they do so without impinging directly or indirectly on a
pregnant woman's privacy rights."); Bailey v. State, 191 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)
(denying
defendant's argument that a fetal murder charge is at odds with Roe or Webster).
22 815 F.2d 1386 (llth Cir. 1987).
22 8
223

Id. at 1388.

229Id.
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interest conflicts with certain constitutional interests of the
mother.... A mother's interests are in no way infringed upon
230
by the statute in question.
The Supreme Court of California reached the same result in
People v. Davis. 23 1 There, the defendant had shot a pregnant woman
during an armed robbery.2 32 As a result of the woman's injuries, her
fetus was stillborn.233 The defendant argued that the state could not
prosecute him for fetal murder because the stillborn fetus could have
been otherwise legally aborted under Roe.234 The California Supreme
Court rejected this argument, writing: "Roe ... forbids the state's
protection of the unborn's interests only when these interests conflict
with the constitutional rights of the prospective parent. The [Roe]
Court did not rule that the unborn's interests could not be recognized
in situations where there was no conflict." 2 35 The Roe decision only
deals with the specific situation of abortion, where a mother's rights
are at issue.236 Fetal murder statutes, however, deal with the state's
recognized interests, where the mother's rights against the state are
not being challenged. These statutes are outside the scope of Roe and
do no injustice to its holding.
5. The Woman and the Attacker Are Not SimilarActors
Furthermore, fetal laws do not challenge abortion rights because,
although each act results in the same end (the destruction of the
fetus), the actor is different in each scenario. Feticide laws and the
right to abortion are based on the rights of the actor, not the rights of
the object. In each scenario, the actor is a different person with a
different set of rights. With abortion, the woman, through her
authorized doctor, is the actor. With fetal murder, a third person, who
does not have the same rights as the woman, is the actor.
Throughout the law, when different actors engage in exactly the
same behavior, one may get penalized while the other may not. The
reason is because Actor A may have affirmative rights to act in a
certain way, whereas Actor B has no rights to perform the same act.
Obvious examples abound. I can drive a car on public roads. My
eleven-year-old niece cannot, even if she does so perfectly. We each
23 0

1d. at 1388 n.2.
872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994).
232
231

233

Id. at 593.

Id.

at 597.
Id. (quoting Pamess, supra note 224, at 144).
236See Forsythe, supra note 40, at 616; Paness, supra note 224, at 97.
234Id.
2 35
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do the exact same thing. One act is criminal, one is not. Note that the
penalty does not depend on the right of the car to be driven. If it did,
there would not be a meaningful distinction between my niece and
me, except insofar as the car gave either of us its consent. The penalty
depends on the rights of the actor, not the rights of the object.
Here is another example. If my dogs grow old and sickly, I may
(reluctantly) choose to put them to sleep. My neighbor, who may see
my dogs suffering, cannot come in and euthanize them on her own.
Although the end-result (destruction of the dogs) is the same, the act
is not the same in character. I have the right to put my dogs down.
Someone else does not possess that same right. It would be foolish to
claim that because my neighbor cannot put my dogs down, my ability
to do so is somehow threatened. This would be true only if the
prohibition against my neighbor was due to the legal status of the dog,
and not the legal rights of the actor.
Now apply this scenario to fetal murder laws. The law says that the
woman can abort her fetus, but a third party abuser cannot. Is this
hypocrisy? Is it legal schizophrenia? Do the limitations on the
aggressor somehow imply limitations on the mother? No, no, and no.
The permissions of the mother and the limitations on the criminal
depend on the rights of the respective parties, not the rights of the
object being acted upon. Roe grants the mother alone the right to
consent to abortion. 23 7 She, and only she, holds that right.2 38 An
abusive third party does not. We need not assume that limitations on
a criminal abuser create constitutional fetal personhood. They mean
nothing more than the simple fact that different actors have different
rights; a third party bad actor has no right to terminate someone else's
pregnancy.
This idea has been used again and again by courts to quash
equal protection challenges to fetal murder laws. Criminal and
civil defendants, when faced with charges of either feticide or fetal
wrongful death, often plead that the charges are a violation of equal
protection.2 39 In People v. Ford,2m for example, an Illinois court
237

See State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ("It is basic doctrine .
that Roe limited to the mother the legal right to consent to the destruction of the unborn
child.").
238
See Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 791 (S.D. 1996) ("A choice to
abort sanctions a mother's decision, not someone else's.").
239 See, e.g., Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d at 290-91 ("Holcomb argues that his rights under the . .
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment are violated by an arbitrary and
unreasonable decision to prosecute him for murder when someone else performing an unlawful
abortion would not be so prosecuted."); State v. Alfieri, 724 N.E.2d 477, 482 (Ct. App. Ohio
1998) (arguing that state's fetal manslaughter statute violated equal protection since a pregnant
mother was exempt but the defendant was not); Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 215
(Pa. 2006) (analyzing the defendant's argument that the state feticide statute violated equal
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relied on the differences between a mother and a criminal attacker to
find that feticide and abortion do not require the same penalty. 241 The
Ford defendant argued that the Illinois fetal homicide statute violated
his federal equal protection rights because a woman could legally end
her pregnancy, while he faced serious penalties for doing the same
thing.242 Essentially, the defendant was arguing that he and the
pregnant woman were "similarly situated persons being treated
dissimilarly."243 The Illinois court disagreed: "Clearly, a pregnant
woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy and the defendant
who assaults a pregnant woman, causing the death of her fetus,
are not similarly situated. . . . A woman has a privacy interest in

terminating her pregnancy; however, defendant has no such
interest." 244 Ultimately, the decision of the court rested on the
respective rights of the parties, and simply put, the third-party did not
have the same privacy liberties as the pregnant woman.245 As noted
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, "Roe v. Wade protects the
woman's right of choice; it does not protect, much less confer on an
assailant, a third-party unilateral right to destroy the fetus."24 Fetal
rights are not even a factor, much less a potent reality.
If we take this actor distinction one step further, we come to the
issue of consent. Forgetting entirely that the fetus even exists,
abortion is a medical procedure performed on the autonomous body
of a pregnant woman. Bodily invasion requires consent.247 This is the
very difference between a battery and a hug. When a woman chooses
abortion, she consents to the actions taken upon her body. Women do
not consent to brutal attacks that end their pregnancies.
Consent alone is enough to distinguish the act of abortion from
the act of feticide. A Missouri appellate court recognized this same
consent distinction when faced with an equal protection challenge to a
feticide charge.248 Instead of arguing that he should be treated the

protection because the pregnant mother could terminate the pregnancy, but he could not)
24581 N.E.2d 1189 (111. App. Ct. 1991).
241
See id. at 1199-1200.
242

24

Id. at 1199.

3Id.

24

4Id.

See also State v. Coleman, 705 N.E.2d 419, 421 (Ct. App. Ohio 1997) ("[Q]uite
simply, there has never been any notion that a third party ... has a fundamental liberty interest
in terminating another's pregnancy.").
6
24 State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1990) (denying the defendant's equal
challenge to a fetal homicide charge).
protection
24 7
See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 764-66 (1985) (holding that police could not force a
to submit to surgery without his consent in order to extract a bullet as evidence).
suspect
24 8
See State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 290-91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
245
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same as a pregnant woman, the defendant in the case argued that he
should receive the same penalty as one who performs an illegal
abortion.249 In Missouri, it is a felony for anyone other than a licensed
physician to perform an abortion. 2 50 The defendant claimed that he
was simply performing an unlicensed abortion, not committing a
murder, and that it violated his equal protection rights to treat the two
arguably identical acts with drastically different penalties. 2 5 1 The
court held that the difference in treatment was not arbitrary, and thus
not unconstitutional, because the mother did not consent to his
actions.252 In contrast, "the [Missouri] abortion statutes assume the
actual or apparent consent of the mother."2 53 Over and over, courts are
acknowledging the differences between feticide laws and abortion
rights; here the distinction is based on lack of consent of the pregnant
woman.
C. The Power of Language
Although this Note contends that a personhood designation is little
more than a signal of legal protection for those other than the fetus, it
is not blind to the weight of the word itself. The term "person" is
morally, religiously, historically, and socially loaded. It may be
legally non-judgmental, but it certainly has moral undertones. As one
writer claims, "When law uses the metaphor 'person' to define its
object, that metaphor acts as a vehicle for expressing beliefs and
values about persons, both [juridical] and natural."254 This, of course,
is undeniable. Imagine if the President of the United States renamed
himself the "God" of the United States. The name change might not
alter the legal rights and duties of the President, but it definitely
packs a heavier punch. This does not mean that feticide laws are
normatively neutral on the issue of abortion; it merely shows that the
laws do not have the legal force of conferring natural personhood on
the fetus, or of diminishing the rights of women. Opponents of these
laws would be quite justified in attacking the value, status, or morals
that may be lurking behind the designation. However, a mere pro-life
motive does not translate into a legal threat to Roe. States are allowed
to express their preferences and beliefs, but personal values do not
create legal capacity.255
Id. at 292.
2 Id.
251Id. at 290-91.
252Id. at 292.
253 Id.
2
54Language of a Legal Fiction, supra note 96, at 1761.
255But see id. at 1765-66 (arguing that state language may not only express values, but
249
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III. FETAL LAWs ACTUALLY PROMOTE REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY
It is not enough to say simply that fetal murder laws do not conflict
with abortion rights. In truth, feticide laws actually promote and
protect the reproductive autonomy of women.256 Colloquially, phrases
such as "reproductive choice" or "women's rights," have become
synonymous with "abortion rights." Almost always, when people
speak of a woman's "choice," they refer to her choice to abort. Of
course, abortion is an integral part of reproductive choice. However, it
is not the only part. An equally essential component of reproductive
choice is the right to bear a child, to be pregnant, and to carry one's
child to full term. 257
True, Roe was a decision about abortion, but it also affirmed a
larger "liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family, and
decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child."258
Reproductive liberty extends to the decision to continue a pregnancy
as much as it does to the decision to end one.259 Otherwise, "the State
might as readily restrict a woman's right to choose to carry a
pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further asserted state
interests in population control, or eugenics, for example." 2 60 As the
Supreme Court noted in Casey, judges have previously relied on Roe
to support a woman's right to bear children.26 1 In Avery v. County of
Burke,262 for example, the Fourth Circuit recognized Roe's "right
of procreation" in condemning a county agency that wrongfully
pressured a young girl to undergo sterilization.263 Likewise, the
Eleventh Circuit, in Arnold v. Board of Education,26 relied on Roe
when holding that school officials violated the Constitution when they
induced a minor to have an abortion. 265 The court recognized
procreation as a corollary-Roe right, asserting:
Resolution of the childbearing decision embraces two
alternatives, those of aborting the child or carrying the child

them, such that the language ultimately brings about the values that it touts).
disseminate
256
Professor Carolyn Ramsey has also argued that feticide statutes may have this capacity.
See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 748.
257

See id.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (emphasis added).

258
25 9

See id. at 859.

260

261Id.

d.

262 660 F.2d 11l (4th Cir. 1981).

263
Id. at
264

265

115.
880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989).

See id. at 311.
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to term. Both alternatives enjoy constitutional protection from
unwarranted governmental interference. While the cases in
this area have dealt primarily with governmental interference
with the abortion alternative, we fail to see how the attention
given the decision to abort in any way diminishes the
protection which should be given the decision to carry the
child to term. We need not create a new constitutional right
to protect Jane Doe's freedom to choose to carry her child
to term; we merely refocus the emphasis concerning this
freedom of choice from the alternative of abortion to the
alternative of procreation. There simply can be no question
that the individual must be free to decide to carry a child to
term.266
The rights of privacy and reproductive liberty encompass the right
to bear children.267 Without these rights, the state would have a better
argument for forcibly sterilizing people or subjecting "unfit" women
268
Would this not also be an affront to
to involuntary abortion.
women? Fetal murder and wrongful death laws are a legitimate way
for the state to protect this aspect of reproductive autonomy. If Roe
primarily holds that the state cannot force pregnancy on women,
fetal laws promote an equally important converse: that third-party
assailants cannot force a woman not to have a child.
If reproductive law is about autonomy, we should expect it to
protect any reproductive future a woman holds for herself. Justice
Ginsburg has expressed how reproductive autonomy is, at its most
basic level, about putting a woman "in control of her destiny and
her place in society."269 Part of what abortion decisions recognize
is the right of a woman to be in charge of how her life unfolds. 270
For some women, this means not having children at a certain time,
with a certain person, or ever. However, for many other women, this
266 Id.
267 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual ... to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." (second emphasis added)).
268State sterilization is of course illegal, again because of a concern for personal liberty.
Justice Douglas wrote that state sterilization amounted to an eternal "depriv[ation] of a basic
liberty." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
269Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199
(1992). Justice O'Connor also wrote from the bench in Casey that reproductive decisions
implicate the overall destiny of a woman. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 852
(1992); id. at 869 (O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, J.J.).
2 70
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Essay, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation
to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 383 (1985).
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means a future with children. Fetal laws only protect women seeking
such a life.
Imagine for a moment that the states concede to the arguments of
some feminist scholars and activists that fetal laws are bad for
women's autonomy. Assume that these states then decide to redact all
feticide laws and overturn all decisions allowing recovery for the
wrongful death of a fetus. Under the new law, fetuses are defined
purely as pieces of property, or extensions of a woman's own body.
Then, if a woman was attacked and lost her pregnancy, she may
have a case for personal battery, and maybe even destruction of her
personal property. Is this a victory for women? Query who stands to
lose the most from this approach. Abusive husbands? Murderers?
Rapists? Arguably those populations would gain from such a change
in the law. Those who would be most adversely impacted, however,
are the very people feticide laws seek to defend: the pregnant women.
Consider a woman who is two, five, or even eight months
pregnant, and who suffers a stabbing, beating, and raping at the hands
of a jealous ex-boyfriend who decides that "his woman" will
not be having another man's baby. How does the law best value
her fundamental right, her innate liberty, to reproduce? By not
recognizing the destruction of her unborn? By treating it as though it
were any other piece of property-a car, a bracelet, a T.V. perhaps?
By chalking it up to just another episode of domestic violence?
Compare how the law will make her whole under such an
interpretation versus under the application of a feticide charge.
Imagine the insult she may suffer if the law fails to punish those who
take away the other half of her reproductive liberty. The irony is that
those who oppose fetal laws in the name of women's rights risk
cutting at the very liberty they presume to promote.
CONCLUSION

America need not polarize every issue regarding pregnancy into a
debate over abortion rights. Yet, in the realm of fetal legislation, a
fearful pro-choice contingent and a hopeful pro-life community have
each done their part to insert abortion politics into otherwise clear
issues of state interests and women's safety. Fetal laws are not
inherently opposed to Roe or abortion rights. Although statutes and
judges use the language of personhood, their words do not have
constitutional ramifications. This shallow personhood categorization
is merely a shorthand way of "describing a complex network of rights
and duties that it would be impossible to describe in any other way,
not . .. a means of curtailing or diminishing constitutional rights that
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real people would otherwise have." 27 1 The fetus is not a person in the
natural sense, and no legislature has the power to declare otherwise.
Instead, the fetus is a juridical person, designated as such so that a
state may assert its own interests in life and achieve certain social
goods. Labeling the fetus a "person" for purposes of these state
interests does not mean that the fetus is a person under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Women's-rights activists should not reject feticide laws-they
should embrace them. Those who do violence to pregnant women do
not have the same rights with respect to the fetus as the mother
does. Their punishment is just, and does not affect a woman's right
to otherwise consent to abortion. If we refuse to fully protect the
unlawful termination of pregnancy, we do a great disservice to the
much-ignored corollary of Roe: the right of women to enjoy and
complete their pregnancies.
Pro-choice Americans have been led, unnecessarily, to fear fetal
legislation for years, and for years, states have extended protection to
fetuses through homicide and tort laws. The question that arises is
exactly how direct is a threat that has existed for decades but has
never had any hope of overturning Roe? In the end, reconciliation of
feticide laws and abortion rights is entirely possible for those who
want it. Unfortunately, lawyers and politicians have a hard time
resisting a good fight, especially when they think there is ground to be
gained. And so the myth of fetal personhood drags on, not as a legal
reality, but as a divisive and impassioned political tool.
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Dworkin, supra note 144, at 400.
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